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OIL SHALE AND THE MINING LAWS
DONALD H. FLORA
of the Denver Bar *

The lessons learned from World War II and the necessity for
insuring a continuous future oil supply for our country, plus the
tremendous steps in acquiring technological "know-how" being
taken by the Bureau of Mines, under authority granted by the
Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act,' have once again called attention to
lands valuable for oil shale. In the process, lawyers have found
themselves faced with new and interesting problems. The purpose
of this article will be to point out certain of those problems and
present the authorities bearing upon their solution; however, a
brief introductory comment on the history of oil shale development and the distribution and nature of oil shale deposits should
prove helpful.
Oil shale deposits have been worked in various countries
throughout the world. The oil shale industry of Scotland perhaps
is the oldest and best known; however, the largest was conducted in
Manchuria by the Japanese during World War II as a source of
liquid fuels for military uses. In this country, considerable interest
was first shown in western oil shales in 1916, the peak of activities
being reached in 1923. The Catlin operation near Elko, Nevada
was perhaps the nearest approach in this country to an oil shale
enterprise on a commercial scale. Over 100. companies were formed
for developing oil shale deposits. A large part of them, however,
proved to be stock promotion deals only, which were detrimental
to the industry. The Bureau of Mines operated an experimental
oil-shale retort plant near Rifle, Colorado from September, 1926 to
June, 1927 and again from April, 1928 to July, 1929. After that
the plant was dismantled since, by this time, the East Texas oil
field had been discovered, and the country had lost interest in substitute liquid fuels. 2 Colorado, particularly in the vicinity of the
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law. A copy of
this article was submitted to the Regional Office of the United States Department of
Interior, Bureau of Land Management, at Salt Lake City, and the following comment
was received from Arthur W. Brown, Acting Regional Administrator:
desires to compliment you on the excellent research job
"This office ...
accomplished on a subject as comprehensive, complicated and disputed as
this one.
; .a. .Your article . . . will be made a permanent part of our records,
and I assure you that it will be consulted frequently by our personnel in
connection with our many mining and oil shale problems."
'Act of April 5, 1944, c. 172, 30 U.S.C. c. 6 (1949 Supp.).
2U. S. Bureau of Mines, Report of Investigations No. 4269
Shale Project, Rifle, Colorado, 1948).

(E.

D. Gardner, Oil
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towns of Rifle, DeBeque and Grand Valley, was one of the principal
centers of activity during the Twenties.
Oil shale is known to occur in about 20 States of the Union
and in Alaska. The most extensive deposits are in the Green River
formation of Colorado, Utah-and Wyoming.3 Presently available
sampled sections indicate the oil shale of Colorado contains 300
billion, that of Utah 42.8 Billion, and that of Wyoming 3 billion
barrels of shale oil. 4 The shale of western Colorado, generally, is
cheaper to mine, apparently richer and probably more persistent
than elsewhere in the Rocky Mountain Region.5 In 1920, about
900,000 acres of public domain in Colorado, 2,700,000 acres in Utah,
and 500,000 acres in Wyoming were classified as chiefly valuable
for their oil shale. About 1,000 square miles, or 640,000 acres, contain oil shale beds of sufficient thickness and richness to be of potential economic importance. Private holdings in the Rifle-DeBeque
area of Colorado comprise about 300 square miles. 6 Immense tonnages of oil shales occur in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee,
but the oil content of these shales is too low for them to be considered of economic importance at present. High-grade oil shale occurs at Elko, Nevada, but the beds are relatively thin, and the tonnage is limited.7
Oil does not exist in oil shale as such; it is not a mere container of residual oil. The oil is present in the form of a complex
organic compound called kerogen. The organic matter is chiefly
the remains of primitive aquatic plants and animals, and is largely
structureless amorphous material derived from the partial putrefaction of aquatic organisms growing during the middle Eocene
period. Upon destructive distillation-that is, heating in the absence of air-this organic material is decomposed, yielding hydrocarbons, oils and permanent gases. 'Shale" is really a misnomer,
as the rock (which is tough and strong) is a magnesium marlstone
and has few of the qualities usually attributed to shale. In the
Parachute Creek horizons (which is the principal oil shale member) of the Green River Formation, the oil shale is divided into
three zones: the main zone, 460 to 630 feet thick; the middle zone,
230 to 270 feet thick; and the lower zone, 205 to 220 feet thick.
These zones are generally separated by 50 to 150 feet of barren
marlstone. The oil shale beds are undisturbed and lie nearly horizontal. Some shale measures of commercial interest outcrop in
cliffs near the top of escarpments. 8 These geologic facts are of
importance in connection with the problem of proper mineral locations, considered below.
3 Note 2, supra.
4 A.I.M.E. Tech. Pub. No. 2358 (Carl Belser, 1948), p. 11.
5A.I. M.E. Tech. Pub. No. 2286 (E. D. Gardner 1947).
'Note 2, supra.
U. S. Bureau of Mines, Report of Investigations No. 4457 (Synthetic Liquid Fuels,
1949), Part II, p. 2.
8 Notes 2, 4, 5, and 7, supra; 17 Oil & Gas Journal 52 (Bureau of Mines, 1919)
A.I.M.E. Tech. Pub. No. 2666A (E. D. Gardner and E. M. Sipprelle, 1949); Dean Win.
chester, Oil Shale of Colorado and Utah, 36 Railroad Red Book 695 (1919).
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LOCATION UNDER THE MINING LAWS

By the turn of the century there had been enacted a considerable number of statutes 9 regulating the disposition of publicly
owned mineral lands. None of these statutes expressly applied to
oil shale. It was in reliance upon these statutory provisions, upon
decisions of the courts and of the Department of the Interior
(which were applicable only by analogy), and upon their own
practical knowledge, that mining men first located oil shale. The
Act of February 25, 1920,10 was the first statute expressly applicable to oil shale. What was probably the first patent to be granted
upon an oil shale location was that to Verner Z. Reed and James
Doyle on land in Garfield County, Colorado, in 1920.11 From 1916,
when activity began, until 1920, there were apparently no authoritative public announcements as to the proper procedure to be
followed, i.e., whether lands valuable for oil shale should be located
as lodes or placers. However, the Department of Interior in each
of the years 1916, 1917, 1918 and 1919 12 answered individual inquiries concerning oil shale generally. The letter of 1916 is discussed below. It is believed that a problem, the exact proportions
of which are unknown, does exist, for as one authority wrote in

1921

:13
Previous to February 25, 1920, oil shale deposits were located
under the mining law of 1872, with its amendments, and it is probable that a considerable acreage of oil shales has been located and
is now being held under that law either as lode or placer claims . . .
It is probable that most oil shale deposits which have been located
under the mining law have been located as placer claims.

9Act of July 4, 1866, 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1940) : In all cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law. Act
of July 26, 1866, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1940) : All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free
and open to exploration and purchase . . . under regulations prescribed by law, and
according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so
far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.
Subsequent sections prescribe certain rules and regulations to govern the location
of "Mining claims upon veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in place bearing gold,
silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits." Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C.
§ 23. This statute also provides the manner of obtaining title from the government for
lands "claimed and located for valuable deposits" under the preceding sections. 30
U.S.C. § 35 (1940) provides: Claims usually called "placers", including all forms of
deposit, excepting veins of quartz or other rocks in place, shall be subject to entry and
patent, under like circumstances and conditions, and upon similar proceedings as are
provided for vein or lode claims. The Act of February 11, 1897, 30 U.S.C. § 101 (1940)
provides: Any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the United
States may enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral
oils. and chiefly valuable therefor, under the provisions of the laws relating to placer
mineral claims.
. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1940) ; 30 U.S.C. § 241 (1940) .
" Interior Department, Instructions, 47 L.D. 548, May 10, 1920.
I"Reviewed
in Instructions of May 10, 1920, note 11, supra.
IS James R. Jones, The Legal Status of Oil Shale Deposits in the Public Domain, 111
Mining Journal 68, 69 (1921).
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And it was said:
The whole matter (of development) has been retarded by the
uncertain status of the land laws, as well as by a general feeling of
uneasiness as to the attitude of the current public
land policy to4
ward any but a meager scale type development.'

Assuming, then, that oil shale land has been located as both placers
and lodes, what authorities bear upon the validity of each?
Applicable General Principles
The following general principles of mining law are applicable:
(1) Whatever is recognized as a mineral by the standard
authorities on the subject, when the same is found in quantity and
quality to render the land sought to be patented more valuable
on this account than for purposes of agriculture, should be treated
5
as coming within the purview of the mining acts of 1872.1 oil
shale has long been recognized as a valuable mineral deposit, and
for many years the mining of such deposits and the distillation of
petroleum and other mineral substances therefrom has been an
extensive industry in Scotland. 6 The Director of the Geological
Survey in 1916 classified large areas in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming as mineral lands, valuable as a source of petroleum and

nitrogen. 17

(2) The amount of land which may be located as a vein or
lode claim, the amount of land which may be located as a placer
claim, the price per acre required to be paid to the Government in
the two cases when patents are obtained, the rights conferred by
the respective locations and patents, and the conditions upon which
such rights are held, differ so materially as to make the question
whether mineral lands claimed in any given case belong to one
class or to the other a matter of importance both to the Government and to the mining claimant.

8

(3) Mineral lands of either class can not be lawfully located
and patented except under the provisions of the statute applicable
to such class. Veins or lodes may be located and patented only
under the law applicable to veins or lodes. Deposits other than
veins or lodes are subject to location and patent only under the
law applicable to placer claims.' 9
(4) The statutes describe a "lode" claim as being upon ".
veins or lodes of quartz and other rock in place bearing gold, silver,
cinnabar, lead, tin, copper, or other valuable deposits." A "placer"
claim, on the other hand, is described as ". . . all forms of de14Symposium on Western Oil Shales, 36 Railroad Red Book 549 (1919).
"43 C.F.R. § 185.2; Interior Dept. B.L.M. Circular No. 1278 § 5; W. H. Hooper,
1 L.D. 560 (1881) ; 36 Railroad Red Book 580 (1919).
"ONote 11, supra; see also, State of Utah v. Watson Oil Co., 50 L.D. 323 (1924),
holding that deposits of oil shale were a valuable mineral deposit in 1905; But cf.,
United States v. Strauss, 58 L.D. 567 (1943).
"Letter, Director, U.S.G.S., to Commissioner, G.L.O., May 23, 1916.
"Henderson v. Fulton, 35 L.D. 652 (1907) ; Harry Lode Mining Claim, 41 L. D.

403 (1912).
9Webb v. American Asphaltum Mining Co., 157 F. 203 (1907) ; note 18, supra, and
cases cited.
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,, 20
posit, excepting veins of quartz, or other rock in place.
(5) What constitutes a lode or vein of mineral matter has
been no easy matter to define. 21 No arbitrary definition can be
given, but the courts and the Department have been guided by the
sense given it by miners, by interpretation of general geological
data and by the character of the particular deposit in question,
and the terms and purposes of the mining laws. 22 The following
definition has often been cited with approval: "In general, it may
be said, that a lode or vein is a body of mineral or mineral body
of rock, within defined boundaries, in the general mass of the mountain ' 23 Another definition is: "In practical mining, the terms
'vein' and 'lode' apply to all deposits of mineralized matter within
any zone or belt of mineralized rock separated from the neighboring rock by well-defined boundaries . . ,,24 Further: "The
controlling characteristic of a vein is a continuous body of mineralbearing rock in place, in the general mass of the surrounding formation." 25 The statute should be interpreted as though it read,
"veins, or lodes, of rock in place." 26 The two essential elements
of a lode are (1) the mineral-bearing rock, which must be in place
and have reasonable trend and continuity, and2 7 (2) the reasonably
distinct boundaries on each side of the same.
(6) While some of the authorities hold the view that only
minerals of the metallic class are within the statutes relating to
veins or lodes, the great weight of authority is the other way, and
the Department is of opinion that the latter is the better view.2 8
Lode Claims for Oil Shale Possible
There are four classes of cases where the courts have been
called upon to determine what constitutes a lode or vein within
the intent and meaning of different sections of the statutes: (a)
those between miners who have located claims on the same lode
under the provisions of sec. 2320, R.S.; (b) those between placer
and lode claimants, under the provisions of sec. 2333; (c) those
between mineral claimants and parties holding town-site patents
to the same ground; and (d) those between mineral and agricularise
tural claimants of the same land. 29 Further, the question may
3
where application for patent is made to the Department. 1
The following examples indicate the distinction drawn between
those deposits contemplated by the placer regulations and those
20Note 9, supra; San Francisco Chemical Co. v. Duffield, 205 F. 480 (1913).
21 Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Chessman, 116 U. S. 529 (1886).
18, 19, and 20, supra; E. M. Palmer, 38 L.D. 294 (1909).
2Notes
23Judge Hallett, cited in Stevens v. Williams, 1 MeCrary 480, Fed. Cas. No. 13,341
(1879).
24 Hayes v. Lavagino, 53 P. 1029 (Utah, 1898) ; Book v. Justice Co., 58 F. 106
(1893).
5Beals v. Cone, 62 P. 948 (1900).
2 1 Lindley on Mines § 299.
21 Barringer & Adams, Law of Mines and Mining, p. 437 ; Henderson v, Fulton, note
18, supra.

2Pacific
Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., 25 L.D. 233 (1897)
18, supra; see also Lindley on Mines, 8§ 86, 323; 1 Snyder on Mines § 337.
"Migeon v. Montana Central Ry. Co.. 77 F. 249 (1896).
so See, for example, Harry Lode Mining Claim, note 18, supra.

; note
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covered by the lode regulations. Beds of marble which do not bear
any mineral substance of value, which do not lie in vein or lode
formation, and which are nothing more than a quarry are locatable
only as a placer, and not as a lode. 31 On the other hand, a broken,
altered, and mineralized zone of limestone, lying between walls
of quartzite, constitutes a lode or vein within the meaning of the
mining laws. 32 And sand-rock or sedimentary sandstone formation in the general mass of the mountain bearing gold was held
to be rock in place bearing mineral, constituting a vein or lode
within the purview of the statute, and a placer entry was held to
be unlawful. 33 One authority 14 has stated that any lode, vein or
deposit of rock in place between defined or definable boundaries
containing any of the precious or economic metals or minerals,
excepting coal, whether metallic or non-metallic, should be held
to be and is locatable-and patentable as a lode claim.
35
In the classic case of Webb v. American Asphaltum Company,
it was the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit,
that asphaltum, varying in its consistency from a liquid to a
semi-liquid condition, may be located as a petroleum, but that when
it assumes the solid form and is found in a vein or lode, it cannot
be located under the petroleum placer statute. If Congress had
intended to include veins of asphaltum in place, the Court held, it
would have so stated in the Act of 1897.36
On the basis of the above principles of mining law and the
decisions cited, and in the absence of any direct Departmental or
judicial authority, location of oil shale deposits on the public domain as lode mining claims would appear to have been justified.
As has been shown, oil shale constitutes a valuable mineral within
the meaning of the mining laws. There is no free oil in the shale,
rather there is an organic matter called kerogen from which shale
oil is produced by distillation. The kerogen is contained in marlstone, which is a rock, both technically and within the statutes.
The rock containing kerogen is found in beds which are undisturbed and lie nearly horizontal, with definable boundaries. 3 Further, under the holding of the Webb case, supra, the mere fact that
petroleum products are derived from the mineral is not sufficient
to bring the entry within the purview of the petroleum placer Act
of 1897 where it occurs in lodes. Logically, therefore, it would
seem that oil shale deposits should be located as lodes. As stated
previously,3 8 it would appear that some claims were so located but
that the matter was one of serious doubt. And an author, writing
in 1918, said:
mHenderson v. Fulton, note 18, supra.

=U. S. Mining Co. v. Lawson, 134 F. 769 (1904), affirmed in 207 U. S. 1.
33E M. Palmer, note 24, supra.
3Snyder on Mines, p. 307 ; Harry Lode Mining Claim, note 18, supra.
.Note 19, supra.
"Note 9, supra.
37See references in note 8, supra.
3See James R. Jones, note 13, supra; Oil Shale Locations, 4 Mining Cong, Journal
7 (1918),
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. . . During the recent hearings at Washington before the Public
Lands Committee of the House on the pending Mineral Lands Leasing
Bills (S. 2812 and H.R. 3232), which measures are to open, on the
leasing principle, the remaining oil, coal and phosphate areas of the
public lands of the U. S., delegates appeared from Utah, Wyoming and
Colorado, urging the necessity for considering at the same time, the
shale oil problem, as there is now no specific law for acquiring title.
to these patent lands. Rights to shale land are being initiated under
placer mining laws. Having in mind the unhappy experiences of
the oil land operators with this inept and archaic law, it is natural
that those fostering the new industry should fear a repetition of the
experience of the oil men with that statute."

The unhappy experience of the oil men, referred to above, is
well-known history. For over 20 years lands valuable for oil and
gas were located under the placer mining statutes, there being no
statute expressly applicable. 40 In 1896 the Department reversed
its previous stand and held that oil was not within the purview
of the statutes. 41 The next year Congress expressly authorized
42
the entry and location of oil lands under the placer mining laws.
Placer Locations Favored by Department
While the status of lode locations for oil shade may be legally
uncertain, though logically sound, there appears to be no such
uncertainty where valid locations were made under the placer mining laws. There exists both direct and indirect authority for this
latter statement. On May 10, 1920, First Assistant Secretary
Vogelsang rendered his decision on the first application for patent
for oil shale placer claims. 43 After reviewing the facts, quoting
the applicable statutes, and pointing to the commercial development taking place as showing the value of oil shale as a mineral,
Mr. Vogelsang reviewed prior statements of the Department which,
he said, had been made "while disclaiming any intention of expressing a binding opinion in the premises." He cited a letter to
Senator Myers, dated May 16, 1916, in which was stated, inter alia:
It would seem that a discovery by competent locators, locating
in good faith, of oil shale unappropriated and on unwithdrawn public
domain, capable, by approved methods, of yielding oil in such quantities so as to make the land chiefly valuable therefor, would be a
sufficient compliance with the provisions of said oil placer act of
1897, and that locations based upon such a discovery must be made
and entered, if at all, under provisions of said Act of 1897."'

Mr. Vogelsang also quoted from a letter of the Director of
the Geological Survey, dated May 23, 1916, to the Commissioner
J. H. G. Wolf, Commercial Aspects of the Shale Oil Industry, 116 Mining & Scientific
4Press 643 (1918).
1Interior
Dept., Instructions, Jan. 30, 1875 (Sickle's Mining Laws 491) ; Maxwell
v. Brierly, 10 C.L.O. 50; In re Rogers, 4 L.D. 284 (1885) ; In re Piru Oil Co.. 16 L.D .
117 (1893) ; Gird v. California Oil Co., 60 F. 531 (1894).
41Union Oil Co., 23 L.D. 222 (1896).
42
Note 9, supra; Union Oil Co., 25 L.D. 351 (1897).
43Note 11, supra.
"Note 11, supra.
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of the General Land Office, classifying oil shale lands as valuable
for petroleum and nitrogen and recommending the lands remain
open under the mineral land laws "even though they are ambiguous and but poorly adapted to deposits of this type." The following language then appears:
Oil shale having been thus recognized by the Department and by
Congress as a mineral deposit and a source of petroleum, and having
been demonstrated elsewhere to be a material of economic importance,
lands valuable on account thereof must be held to have been subject to
valid location and appropriationunder the placer mining laws, to the
same extent and subject to the same provisions and conditions as if
valuable on account of oil or gas. Entries and applications for patent for oil shale placer claims will therefor be adjudicated by your
office in accordance with the same legal provisions and with reference to the same requirements and limitations as are applicable to
oil and gas placers."

This decision occasioned much comment in mining circles.
That it was generally received with relief is indicated by the caption of an article which appeared shortly thereafter, to-wit, "Oil
Shale Entries Made Prior to Leasing Law are All Right." 46 This,
of course, was because most claims had been located under the
placer regulations. The decision would appear to be in direct conflict with the Webb case, supra. In effect, it decides that "oil"
(really kerogen and not oil at all), even though it appears in solid
form and in lode or vein formations, is nevertheless subject to
entry and patent under petroleum placer mining laws. There appears little doubt that the problem was carefully considered by
the Department, and that the decision was rendered with full
realization that the applicable laws were "ambiguous and but
poorly adapted to deposits of this type."
That the rule as stated by Mr. Vogelsang has been, and is, considered the law is indicated by the fact that in more than 30
decisions and regulations issued by the Department, and in two
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, all directly concerned with oil shale, the propriety of locating such lands as placer
claims has never been questioned,. but rather seems to have been
assumed. 47 And, as stated by the United States Supreme Court
under different circumstances, " . . . in the construction of a
doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction
of those who are called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to great
respect," 48 and "ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons." 49 And the Department has said, " . . . This view having
been generally accepted for so long a time, and property rights
having grown up under it, there should be, in my judgment, the
45Reviewed in Instructions of May 10, 1920. note 11, supra.
4011, Paint & Drug Reporter, June 21, 1920, p. 15.
4,See, for example, Dennis v. Utah, 51 L.D. 229 (1925); Krushic v. U. S., 280
U S. 306 (1930) ; Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639 (1934).
45Brown v. U. S.,113 U. S. 568 (1884).
4United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760 (1837).
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clearest evidence of error, as well as very strong reasons of policy
and justice controlling, before there should be a departure from
it." 50 Many thousands of acres of land held under such placer
locations have gone to patent.
In summation, then, it appears that oni shale deposits on the
public domain are properly locatable under the petroleum placer
mining laws. In the case of lode claims, however, the matter is
not so clear. Pursuant to the instructions of May 10, 1920, 51 and
from Mr. Vogelsang's letter to Senator Myers, there is indication
that a patent on such a location would be denied. If declarations
by the Department were not deemed controlling, it would seem
that location by lode would be proper and, indeed, technically
more accurate than a placer location. As stated, the Department's
decision is in conflict in principle with the Webb case, supra, although that case dealt with asphaltum rather than oil shale. The
general principle that mineral lands of either class (lode or placer)
can not be lawfully located and patented except under the provisions of the statute applicable to such class, is a double-edged
sword; if the Department's decision is controlling (which undoubtedly it is in view of the vested rights which have grown up
under it), then the principle operates against lode claims; otherwise the principle operates against placer claims. No direct authority has been found as to the validity of a lode location for
oil shale.
THE REQUISITE DISCOVERY

"No location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of a vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." 52
Placer claims shall be subject to entry and patent "under like
circumstances and conditions or upon similar proceedings as are
provided for vein or lode claims." 53
The general rule as to discovery may be stated thus: where
minerals have been found and the evidence is of such character
that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a valuable mine, the requirements
of the statute have been met. The geological structure and development of minerals on adjacent lands are pertinent. It is not
necessary that the discovery be such that the mineral54in its present
situation can be immediately disposed of at a profit.
However, in an unreported decision of July 29, 1925, 55 the
"Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., note 28, supra.
51Note 11, supra.
52 30 U.S.C. 8 23 (1940).
53 30 U.S.C. § 35 (1940).
"Freeman v. Summers, 52 L.D. 201 (1927).
NFreeman v. Summers, (unreported), July 29, 1925, cited in Empire Gas & Fuel

Co., 51 L.D. 424 (1926).
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Department created a furor among mining men by holding that a
discovery was valid only if it was of a richness equal to or exceeding that provided by the rule adopted by the U.S.G.S. in its regulations of April 3, 1916, for the classification of lands with respect
to their oil shale character (15 gallons per ton for beds not less
than one foot thick which were too deep to be mined by open-cut
methods).
The decision occasioned much comment, and the Secretary
ordered further hearings, largely to obtain additional expert testimony. In 1926 many prominent mining men interested in the
matter obtained a hearing before the Secretary. The following
year rehearings were held in the case. In the decision rendered
September 30, 1927,56 the earlier decision was recalled and vacated.
The Department stated in the later ruling that although the impression had become general, it had not been the purpose of the
prior decision to rule that the regulations would be used as a
yardstick, that the Department had endeavored to correct this
impression by subsequent communications, and that the true rule
was (and is) that each case presented must be determined upon
the facts there disclosed. The Department then held that the following evidence showed a sufficient discovery: that in this particular area of Colorado the lands contained the Green River formation, and that this formation carries oil shales in large and
valuable quantities; that while the beds vary in the richness of
their content, the formation is one upon which the miner may rely
as carrying oil shale which, while yielding at places comparatively
small quantities of oil, in other places yields larger and richer quantities-in other words, having made his initial discovery at or
near the surface, he may with assurance follow the formation
through the lean to the richer beds.
While the decision is not couched in the terms usually found
in statements of the rule, yet the effect seems to be to reaffirm
that rule.
THE LEASING ACT OF 1920 57
The leasing Act is expressly made applicable to oil shale, as
well as the other minerals named therein. By the Act, deposits of
the minerals within its scope were thereafter to be dealt with on
the leasing principle. As to such minerals, the previous system
of locating such deposits as lode or placer claims, with the right
to apply for patent, was abolished, except with respect to certain
existing claims.
Section 21 deals exclusively with oil shale, while sections 26
to 38, inclusive, are general provisions applicable to oil shale and
the other minerals covered by the act. Section 21 provides:
56 Note 54, supra.
67Act of February 25, 1920 (Public Law No. 146) ; 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. § 241.
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that no lease shall exceed 5,120 acres.

(2) that leases shall be described by legal subdivisions of the
public-land survey, or if unsurveyed, to be surveyed by the United
States at the expense of the applicant.
(3) that leases may be for indeterminate periods.
(4) that conditions and covenants relative to methods of mining, prevention of waste, and productive development may be
imposed.
(5) that the annual rental shall be $.50 per annum per acre,
and that the lessee shall pay such royalties as are specified in the
lease; that rentals may be credited against royalties; that royalties are subject to readjustment at the end of each 20-year period;
and that the Secretary may, in his discretion, waive the payments
of any royalty and rental during the first 5 years of the lease.
(6) that no person, association or corporation may be granted
more than one lease.
As stated, sections 26 to 38, inclusive, are those generally
applicable to coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, gas and oil shale. Only
two of these sections will be mentioned in passing. Oil shale is
conspicuous by its absence from the enumeration of coal, phosphate
and sodium in that part of section 27 which prohibits any person,
association or corporation from holding more than one lease in
any one State at one time, with further restrictions upon holding
interests in other leases indirectly, e.g., as a stockholder, etc.
However, oil shale is specifically mentioned in a subsequent provision of the same section prohibiting unlawful trusts, contracts
or conspiracies in restraint of trade in the mining and selling of
certain named minerals. Nevertheless, it has been decided by the
Department 58 that although oil shale is not mentioned in the above
provision, that the prohibition does apply to oil shale. The decision points out that the maximum acreage for oil shale leases is
twice that for other minerals, that section 21 prohibits the granting of more than one oil shale lease to any one person, etc., that
the regulations provide for a statement of interests held and that
the total does not exceed 5,120 acres, and that the lease form provides for a covenant for faithful observance of section 27.
Section 37 embodies the provision which has caused probably
more uncertainty and more litigation than any other single provision of the mining laws. This is the so-called "saving clause"
as to valid existing claims under the prior mining law. Controversy as to the interpretation of this section has arisen mainly in
connection with the necessity of doing annual assessment work,
and is discussed under "Assessment Work," infra.
58Limitations Respecting the Leasing of Oil-Shale Deposits, 48 L.D. 635 (1922).
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Referring back to section 21, another provision thereof grants
a preference right to lease to certain individuals. 59
REGULATIONS ISSUED PURSUANT TO ACT OF

1920 60

It is provided by section 3 (e) that the applicant for lease must
produce evidence that the land is valuable for its oil shale content
with a statement as accurate as may be of the character and extent
and mode of occurrence of the deposits. By section 3(f) he must
state his proposed method, so far as determined, as to the process
of mining and reduction to be adopted, the diligence with which
such operations will be carried on, and the contemplated investment in reduction works and development, and the capital available therefor. Section 3(g) provides that the register will fix the
time within which adverse or conflicting claims may be filed, which
is to be not less than 30, nor more than 40 days from first publication. The area and form of the lease is discretionary with the
Secretary. 61 The first year's rental ($.50 per acre) must be paid
within 30 days from notice that the right to a lease is granted.6 2 A
form of lease is given, 63 clause 4(a) of which is a covenant to
spend an agreed minimum sum of money (spread over 5 years)
for mining operations, and clause 4(b) of which requires a bond
conditioned upon such expenditures being made. Clause 4(g) sets
forth the required standard of diligence.
Section 7 deals with the preferred rights to a lease given by
section 21 of the Act. It is stated, " . . . Claimants of such
preferred rights to lease should present same promptly; otherwise
the lands may be leased to others, in which case any preference
rights under this proviso will be deemed to have lapsed." Although
no direct authority has been found, it would seem that the language of section 21 of the Act and the interpretation given section
37 thereof by the Supreme Court in the Krushnic and VirginiaColorado Development Corp. cases 64 would forbid any such action
by the Department, and that the provision is beyond its authority,
if interpreted to mean that prior valid claims could thus be extinguished.
ASSESSMENT WORK

Such a conflict of opinion between the Department and mining men arose as to the effect of section 37 upon the necessity for
59It

is provided that: . . . any person having a

valid claim to such minerals

(oil

shale) under existing laws on Jan. 1, 1919, shall, upon relinquishment of such claim,
be entitled to a lease under the provisions of this section for such area of the land relinquished as shall not exceed the maximum area authorized by this section to be leased
to an individual or corporation; Provided, however, That no claimant for a lease who
has been guilty of any fraud or who had knowledge or reasonable grounds to know of
any fraud, or who has not acted honestly and in good faith, shall be entitled to any of
the benefits of this section.
GOInterior Dept., Circular No. 671, March 11, 1920. See also, Circular 1729, April,
1949, 43 C.F.R. 191.
all 6.

Note 61, supra.
8 j6.
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47, aupra.

June, 1950

DICTA

doing annual assessment work 65 to maintain the validity of existing claims that it was necessary for the Supreme Court to pass
upon two such cases before the matter was thought settled.
In 1927 the Department was presented with the following
case 66 for decision: one Emil L. Krushnic and others had located
certain oil shale placer claims in 1919. It was questionable whether
the required assessment work was done for the year 1920. No
third person ever attempted to relocate the claim. On December
16, 1922, Krushnic (having acquired the interest of his co-locators)
applied for patent. After the filing of such application, the Department instituted contest proceedings. Krushnic defended by
pointing to the familiar provision of mining law that as to land
subject to relocation by another upon default of the prior locator
in the performance of annual assessment work, the forfeiture is
not consummated until some one else enters with the intent to
appropriate the property under the mining laws ;67 further, that
under the pre-existing law the Government did not possess the
character of an adverse claimant, and that the Act of 1920 did
not change this rule, even though by the Act the lands were withdrawn from entry under the placer mining laws so that no third
person could relocate the claim and thus compel a forfeiture. 68 In
short, by section 37 of the Act valid claims then existing were
protected, previously failure to do assessment work did not ipso
facto work a forfeiture, and the validity of a claim was not affected
by the fact that neither the Government nor a third person could
compel forfeiture by failure to do assessment work. However, the
Department ruled otherwise, declaring (1) that one of the objects
of the Act was to raise additional public revenue by rents and
royalties from leases rather than making free grants, and (2) that
the provision of the earlier statute 69 relating to the resumption
of work as preventing forfeiture had no application to lands no
longer subject to relocation.
Krushnic took an appeal from the decision, and in the lower
65
On each claim located after May 10, 1872, and until patent has been issued
therefor, not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made
during each year . . . and upon failure to comply with these conditions, the claim or
mine upon which such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the same manner
as if no location of the same had ever been made, provided that the original locators,
their heirs, assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed work upon the clairri
after failure and before such relocation . . ." 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1940). 30 U.S .C. § 29
(1940) provides the procedure for obtaining patent, including among others, the following requirement: ". . . The claimant at the time of filing this application, or at any time
thereafter, within the sixty days of publication, shall file with the register a certificate
of the United States Survey-General that $500 worth of labor has been expended or
improvements made upon the claim by himself or grantors . . ." The Act of Feb. 25,
1920, § 37, 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1940) provides: That the deposits of . . . oil shale
in lands valuable for such minerals, . . . shall be subject to disposition only in the
form and manner provided in this Act, except as to valid claims existent at date of
passage of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under which
initiated, which claims may be perfected under such laws, including discovery. (Emphasis added.)
" Emil L. Krushnic, 52 L.D. 282 (1927).
7 See, for example, Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881); Oscamp v. Crystal
River Mining Co., 58 F. 293 (1893) ; Field v. Tanner, 22 Colo. 278, 75 P. 916 (1904)
Bingham Amalgamated Copper Co. v. Ute Copper Co., 181 F. 748 (1910).
a United States v. U. S. Borax Co., 58 I.D. 426 (1943).
0 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1940).
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70
court secured a writ of mandamus directing that patent be issued.
The court reasoned that there was no apparent intention on the
part of Congress to include within the terms of the Act claims
initiated under the mining law and which had valid existence at
the date of passage; that the locator is not subjected to any forfeitures that did not apply to the mining law; that it had generally been held that a failure to do assessment work did not, in
the absence of intervention of a relocator, work a forfeiture; and
that both the Department and the courts had recognized that the
statutory requirements as to assesment work were not a matter
of concern to the Department. The Department relied heavily on
the case of Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co.,71 but the court refused to
follow it, holding that the fundamental error in the opinion was
in deciding that failure to do assessment work automatically terminated a locator's rights. The court disposed of the Department's
argument that if the Leasing Act only prohibited the relocation
by the third party of an existing mining claim, the original locator
might defer his assessment work indefinitely or so long as he could
evade the charge of abandonment, by reasoning: (1) that such
mining claim, even though patent is never secured therefor, is
property in the fullest sense of the word, and has always been
considered transferable without infringing the title of the United
States; (2) that a part of this property right was to resume delinquent assessment work without penalty in the absence of relocation; (3) that such claims were authorized under a statutory policy
of aid to the mining industry, rather than to secure revenue to
the Government; and (4) that "if Congress intended in the Leasing Act to deprive a prior locator of this valuable privilege, it
would have given expression to that intent in clear and unmistakable language." The lower court granted mandamus.
Certiorari was granted, 72 and the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court, 73 pointing out resumption of work by
the original locator after default "is an act not in derogation, but
in affirmance, of the original location; and thereby the claim is
'maintained' no less than it is by the performance of the annual
assessment work. Such resumption does not restore a lost estate;
it preserves an existing estate." However, certain language in
the opinion was to lead to further litigation; the interpretation
given this language is considered below. The Department in compliance with the decision clearlisted Krushnic's application for
patent.
Another case 74 came before the Department shortly after the
Krushnic case, and prior to the Supreme Court decision thereon.
The Department followed its views previously expressed, and
70U. S. v. West, 30 F. 2d 742 (1929).
n17 F. 2d 71 (1927).
T2Wilbur v. U. S., 179 U.S. 831.
Is280 U. S. 306 (1930) ; 53 L.D. 45 (1930).
T4 Standard Shales Products Co., 52 L.D. 522 (1928).
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denied patent for failure to perform assessment work for the year
1919 where claimant did not file notice of intention to hold in
order to take advantage of statutory relief from assessment work
and did not resume work prior to the passage of the Leasing Act.
On rehearing,7" the Department vacated its decision so as to follow
the decision of the court in the Krushnic case.
Department Claims Right to Challenge for Default
It has been mentioned that certain language of the Court in
the Krushnic case led to further litigation. The Court, after stating that a claim is "maintained" by resumption of work regardless of whether assessment work had previously been done, continued, " . . . unless at least some form of challenge on behalf
of the United States to the valid existence of the claim has intervened."
In instructions issued February 28, 1930, and June 17, 1930,76
the Department interpreted this statement to mean that the Government was in the same position as an adverse claimant under
the statutes 77 insofar as challenging a default in assessment work
was concerned, and that the challenge must be made at a time when
the claim was not being maintained. It was declared that in order
to make a lawful challenge, action must be taken "at a time when
there is an actual default and no resumption of work, and prior
to the time the patent proceedings including the publication of
notice have been completed." In the case under consideration,
challenge was not made until 7 months after patent had issued,
and therefore the challenge was held unlawful.
In two subsequent cases 78 the Department reaffirmed its interpretation of the language in the Krushnic case, and expressly declared that it was following the policy that default in performance of assessment work not cured by a resumption of work was
a valid ground of challenge by the United States to the valid existence of the claim. Undoubtedly, said the Department, it had
authority to determine whether a valid claim was initiated prior
to the date of passage of the act. " . . . The public interest dictates that the facts bearing upon such inquiry (as to whether the
claim was valid as regards discovery, marking boundaries, etc.)
should be ascertained and established when the evidence is available, and not postponed to await the day now apparently remote
and unpredictable, when mining operations to extract oil shale
have become economically practical and profitable, and rights under
the Leasing Act would be invoked by persons wishing to avail themTO
53 L.D. 42 (1930).
"Interior Dept., Instructions, 53 L.D. 131, June 17, 1930.
"...
If no adverse claim shall have been filed with the register and receiver of
the proper land office at the expiration of 60 days of publication, it shall be assumed
that the applicant is entitled to a patent . . . and therefore no objection from third
parties to the issuance of a patent shall be heard, except it be shown that the applicant
has failed to comply with the terms of this chapter." 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1940).
78Francis D. Weaver, 53 L.D. 175 (1930) ; The Federal Shale Oil Co., 53 L.D. 213
(1930).
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selves of its provisions, but when in all probability the question
of whether a particular tract of land was within the purview of
the act or within the exception of valid claims would be difficult
to resolve correctly because of the obliteration or effacement of
evidence by lapse of time, and spurious claims would have to be
permitted to stand for lack of evidence to establish their invalidity." 79 The Department claimed for itself, for the same reasons and under authority of the Krushnic case, jurisdiction to
attack oil shale claims for failure to "maintain" them subsequent
to passage of the Act. No other cause for challenge could arise,
said the Department, since the Court was referring to claims admitted to be valid at the date of the Leasing Act. Subsequent maintenance, not merely prior status, was the test stated by the court.
If the default were established, authority existed to declare the
claim null and void, and the land became subject to the operation
of the Act. Dual forms of challenge by institution of proceedings
and by posting notice of actual repossession were considered proper.
On another occasion the Department determined the requisites of
a resumption of work sufficient to prevent forfeiture. s0
The matter was further clarified by the decision of the Supreme Court in a case decided in 1934.1 The Department had
affirmed the Commissioner's decision holding invalid oil shale
placers upon which assessment work for the year 1931 had not
been performed and where the work had not been resumed prior
to challenge by posting. The Department rejected the contention
that the language of the court in the Krushnic case should be interpreted to permit only challenges "to the valid existence of the
claim at the time the Leasing Act went into effect," e.g. that the
location was fraudulent, that it was a mere paper location without discovery or actual possession in search of minerals or marking
of boundaries, or abandoned at the date of the Leasing Act. This
interpretation was held untenable since none of these grounds
had any reference to assessment work, and their validity would
not be affected by the fact that the owner did or did not do the
assessment work. Rather, the Court was speaking of a claim which
was valid at the date of the Act (as was that of Krushnic), and
thus could have meant only a challenge of default in the performance of assessment work.
Oil Shale Placer Claim Immune from Government Challenge
The decision of the Department was reversed by the lower
court, and that court's judgment was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. While the Court does not expressly say, nor decide, that an
oil shale placer claim valid at the passage of the Act of 1920 is
from that date forward valid and immune from attack though
there is never a dollar's worth of assessment work done, that reTThe Federal Shale Oil Co., note 78, supra.
"OShale Oil Co., 53 L.D. 572 (1931).
Ickes v Virginia-Colorado Development

Corp., 295 U.

S. 639 (1934).
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sult might seem to follow logically when read with the Krushnic
case. The Court, of course, drew heavily from the earlier decision.
In the Krushnic case, no adverse proceedings were taken until application had been made for patent and at a time when the necessary expenditures for improvements for patent had been made.
In the instant case, however, the facts were somewhat different.
Challenge had been instituted at a time when there was actual
default and apparently before claimant had resumed work. However, in claimant's answer, it was alleged that claimant had intended to resume and had made arrangements for that resumption
which would have been had but for the action of the Department.
It is to be noted that in the one case there had actually been resumption of work, while in the other preparations for such resumption had been made, both prior to challenge. The language in
the two opinions is practically identical. Both decisions emphasize
that under the general mining laws a valid mining location is a
grant by the United States to the locator of the right of present,
exclusive possession; that performance of annual assessment work
serves but two purposes-to protect the claim against location by
another and as expenditures toward making up the $500 sum
necessary for patent; that a failure to do such work does not ipso
facto work a forfeiture, but that resumption of the work "is in
affirmance of and preserves an existing estate"; that the matter
of annual expenditure has never been considered a matter for
concern to the Department; and that the possessory right was in
all events (herein discussed) good as against the United States
even though no work was done.
What then, is the effect of (1) the fact that the lands were
withdrawn from entry under the previously existing mining law
so that third persons cannot relocate upon default; (2) the provision of section 37 of the Act of 1920 which saves valid claims
"thereafter maintained"; and (3) the language in the Krushnic
case that a claim is "maintained" upon resumption after default
"unless . . . some form of challenge . . . to the valid existence
of the claim has intervened"?
First, let it be noted that in both cases the word "maintained"
was used in connection with the "resumption" of work. And, as
stated, both cases involved "resumption" of work, actual or prepared. This would seem to lead to the conclusion reached by the
Department that there is a requirement of continued assessment
work even after the date of the Act. But, in the Virginia-Colorado
Corporation case, it was held that the "challenge" given the Department by the Krushnic case referred to the grounds of "lack
of discovery, fraud, or other defect, or that it was subject to cancellation by reason of abandonment," and thus by inference not
to assessment work, as insisted by the Department. Thus, it would
seem that the interpretation adopted by mining men was sup-
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ported. The Court further weakened the position of the Department by holding that the "challenge" mentioned in the Krushnic
case was "a reservation, not a decision, and it does not aid the
government in its contention here." If this reasoning be correct,
then it would seem that the effect of the propositions stated in (2)
and (3) above is that a claim is "maintained" even after default,
if work is resumed, and that preparations for resumption are likewise sufficient; and further, that the Krushnic case added nothing
to the jurisdiction of the Department to challenge.
In answer to the first proposition, reference may be made to
the opinion of the lower court, in its well-reasoned opinion on the
Krushnic matter, to-wit: " . . . It would require a stretch of
the imagination to hold that under the existing policy it was intended by Congress that the Government, through its Secretary
of Interior, might assume the functions of a relocater and enforce
the forfeiture of the locator and dispossess him of his claim." This
language may possibly be weakened by a later passage, " . . . If
Congress had intended in the Leasing Act to deprive a prior locator
of this valuable privilege (of resuming work), it would have given
expression to that intent in clear and unmistakable language .... "
Of course, locations are subject to cancellation upon proof of abandonment, but whether the mere failure of performing assessment
work with the undoubted intent of holding on to potentially valuable properties would be sufficient proof is conjectural.
Conclusions As to Assessment Work
Thus, with regard to oil shale placer claims located before the
passage of the Leasing Act, and upon which it may be questionable
whether assessment work has been done, it appears that the cases
support the following conclusions:
(1) Until the passage of the Act, default in performing assessment work merely gave rise to the possibility of a valid relocation
by third parties; if no such event occurred, then the claim was
valid in so far as the assessment work was concerned, and such
validity was not impaired by the passage of the Act. Until the
passage of the Act, it seems certain that the Department had no authority to challenge on such grounds.
(2) As regards assessment work subsequent to the Act:
(a) Mere default is not sufficient to invalidate the claim.
And the recording of the prescribed notice in lieu of labor neither
adds to nor detracts from such validity. 2 This is the situation
where no challenge was ever made by the Department.
(b) Where there was actual default and where the Department challenged the claim, still the Department's action was
beyond its authority if such challenge was made at a time:
(i) after expiration of the sixty-day period allowed other adverse claimants to contest applications for patent; or
in

2 Note 74, supra; Oil Shale Placer Claim, 54 L.D. 244 (1933).
The Department
its opinion expressly confined its ruling to cases where the statute did not provide

for forfeiture for noncompliance.
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(ii) when the locator intended to and had made
arrangements preparatory to resuming work, and thus the Department's action interfered with such right. The conclusions
stated thus far appear to have express authority.
(iii) And it would seem that the conclusion follows that there never existed in the Department a right to challenge
such claims on the ground of default of assessment work, whether
such83default occurred prior or subsequent to the passage of the
Act.
(iv) Abandonment, of course, remains a ground
for challenge.
The significance of certain other decisions of the Department
regarding assessment work is much lessened if the view previously expressed with regard to the initial necessity for such work
is considered correct. Hence, these decisions will be mentioned only
in passing. As regards group assessment work, it has been held that
the provisions of the Act of 1903 84 relating to oil placers and limiting the benefits of common improvement work to five claims does
not apply to oil shale placer claims, 8 5 but that the locator is entitled to perform such work under the general law applicable to
group work generally.86 As to the character of the work, the Department has declared, " . . . Where the work has actually been
done in good faith, and is reasonably adapted to the purpose for
which it was designed, although it may not have been the best
possible mode of development, the Department will not substitute
its judgment as to its wisdom or expediency for that of the owner."' It is apparent that the general rules apply.
In terms of policy, it would seem that the struggle of the
Department has resulted in at least a semblance of assessment
work being done during part of the years since the passage of the
Act of 1920, and that the problem then faced by the Department
no longer exists. Then the problem was to promote development
in the face of a law which apparently freed locators from the
necessity of assessment work at a time when economically feasible development seemed many years in the future. Today genuine
economic development seems assured. It would appear that the
interests of the nation would be better served by greater stability
in titles to oil shale lands, rather than uncertainties created by
litigation over the interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Probably most mining men believe that there is no requirement for
the Virginia-ColoradoCorp.
3 The Department, in
stand or fall on the broader ground of its existance of
action in filing a motion to dismiss, it admitted that a
to resume work; however, it appears that it was this

case, supra, evidently elected to
a right to challenge, since by its
claimant had made preparations
very ground upon which the de-

cision turned. No doubt, the Department believed that the facts in the case were as clear
as could be proved (in the absence of proof of abandonment), and when overruled
there, conceded defeat on the broader issue. Many years have elapsed since this adverse
decision, and no later cases on the point have been found.
s430 U.S.C. § 102 (1940).
5Notes 66 and 74, supra; Interior Dept., Instructions, 52 L.D., 334, March 10,
1928; Interior Dept., Instructions, 52 L.D. 333, Nov. 12, 1927 ; Smallhorn Oil Shale
Refining Co. and Frederick J. Crampton, 52 L.D. 329 (1928).

"Note

85, supra.

O Note 74, supra.
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assessment work on such claims and that the Department has
always been without right to challenge for default.
THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1930
Pursuant to statutory authority,88 by Executive Order of April
15, 1930,89 and subject to valid existing rights, the deposits of oil
shale and lands containing such deposits owned by the United
States were temporarily withdrawn from lease or other disposal,
and reserved for the purposes of investigation, examination and
classification.9 0 No applications were accepted after that date, except applications for patent under the mining laws for metalliferous mining claims, or applications under other public land laws
which were based on claims initiated prior to the date of the withdrawal. Although maps were prepared for the register of each
district showing the lands containing oil shale of recognized commercial importance in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah, the withdrawal included lands, in fact, valuable for oil shale though not
shown on the map. Entries, filings or selections thereafter allowed
were subject to cancellation prior to patent if found to be valuable
for oil shale.9 1
The order has been construed as a withdrawal from every
form of claim except for metalliferous minerals, and even for the
allowance of a railroad right-of-way across certain of these lands,
executive orders modifying the order of April f5, 1930, have been
necessary.9 2 However, the Act of February 28, 1931, 93 has been
construed to permit stock-raising homestead applications on such
lands. 9 4 And a later Executive Order modified the orignal order to
authorize the Secretary to issue oil and gas permits and leases
under the Act of 1920 on such lands.95
As concerns the effect of the withdrawal on existing claims,
the only decision found concerning oil shale claims was one holding that a mineral reservation under the Act of 1914 96 would not
be required in trust patents to be issued for Uncompahgre Ute
Indian allotments pending on the date of the withdrawal.9 7 The
withdrawal, of course, states that it is "subject to valid existing
rights."
A recent decision 98 of the Department is of interest and importance. The case involved the action of the Commissioner in
rejecting applications for oil shale leases under the Act of 1920,
which applications were filed in 1943. The applicant, Frank A.
8Act of June 25, 1910,

as amended Aug. 24, 1912, 43 U.S.C.

§ 141,

142

(1940)

:

16 U.S.C. § 471 (1940) ; Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co. v. U. S., 273 U. S.

456 (1927).
8"Executive Order No. 5327, April 15, 1930.
10 Withdrawal of Oil Shale Lands, Executive Order of April 15, 1930, 53 L.D. 127.
01 Note 90, supra.
9, Executive Orders Nos. 5708, 5723, and 5772, cited in Langdon H. Larwill. 54 L.D.
190 (1933).
9343 U.S.C. § 291 (1940).
941nterior Dept., Circular No. 1244, 53 L.D. 346 (1931).

0 Executive Order No. 6016, Feb. 6, 1933.
mAct of July 17, 1914,

30 U.S.C. § 121 (1940).

9,Interior Dept., Instructions, 53 L.D. 538, Nov. 13, 1931.
"Frank A. Kelly ("N" Denver 052584; A. 23911, A. 23912-July 12, 1945).
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Kelly, appealed on the ground that the withdrawal of 1930 should
be revoked as to the land in question. The Department denied his
petition on the basis of a memorandum from the U.S.G.S. in
which it was stated that there was insufficient economic warrant
at that time for modifying the order on the grounds that the oil
shale industry is still in the experimental stage and not demonstrably able to compete successfully with the oil fields and refineries; further, that Kelly had failed to show, as required by the
regulations 99 his proposed method of mining and reduction, his
contemplated investment, and the amount and source of capital
available therefor. It was felt that the best interests of the Government would lie in awaiting the result of the research and experimentation provided for by Congress before making its oil
shale reserves available for what could be only speculative development. It was pointed out there was abundant non-Federal land
available in the area for that purpose. It was suggested that when
feasible methods of oil shale exploitation had been developed, a
Government policy of disposing of its shale holdings by competitive leasing might be justified. Kelly challenged the statement that
there was not at present sufficient economic warrant for modifying the withdrawal, and pointed to the development authorized by
the Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944 and the selection of a site
near Rifle, Colorado, on which the first demonstration plant was
to be erected. He declared such action was made necessary by the
precipitous decline in oil reserves. The Department considered the
synthetic liquid fuels legislation as indicating quite the contrary,
that considerable research and experimentation was yet required
before a commercial program could be undertaken. Kelly further
declared that he would follow the best method of mining and reduction demonstrated by the Bureau of Mines, that the investment
would be in keeping with costs as determined by the Bureau for
good mining practice, and that the source of capital would probably
be "venture money". He criticized the proposal that leasing be by
competitive bidding, contending it would operate to the detriment
of the small independent operator. However, the Department considered Kelly's statement of his technical and financial plans as
being too vague; the best methods of production, said the Department, were apparently yet to be developed by the Bureau of Mines;
he had seemingly made no arrangements for securing capital; and
he inferentially admitted that the development of the lands would
be of a speculative nature. His motions for rehearing were denied,
and the applications rejected.
In 1948 it was stated that the oil shale lands had not yet been
restored and that " . . . Large areas of potentially rich oil shale
As of this writing,
"
lands are still in public ownership .... "100
the withdrawal 'rder of 1930 remains in effect.
- Note 60, aupra.
2 Letter, Chief, oil Shale Mining Dlv., SLFP, Denver, to Theron Wasson, Chief
July 15, 1948.
Geologist, Pure Oil Co., Chicago, Ill.,
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REGULATION OF NATURAL GASFEDERAL V. STATE*
RALPH SARGENT, JR.
of the Denver Bar

In recent years, along with the tremendous growth of the
natural gas industry, far exceeding that of almost all other industries in the post war era, has come a demand for clarification of the
original Natural Gas Act of 1938. Decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States since 1938 interpreting the authority of the
Federal Power Commission under the Natural Gas Act have confused and clouded the authority of the Federal Power Commission
over the natural gas industry. This confusion has resulted in a
demand for legislation to clarify the Natural Gas Act. It is important to the natural gas industry, and to the public at large that
the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission on the one hand
and that of the state public utility commissions on the other hand
be explicitly defined.
1938
The natural gas industry as it has developed is unique, the
market for natural gas being in one area of the country and the
source of supply in another, resulting in the construction of
interstate pipe-line transmission facilities to carry the natural
gas from the source of supply to the great markets of natural gas
consumption, sometimes as many as 2,000 miles away from where
the gas was produced and gathered. This unique physical setup of
the natural gas industry has complicated the problem of regulation
of this industry by proper governmental bodies in the public interest.
Prior to the Natural Gas Act in 1938, many of the states, particularly in the areas of consumption of natural gas, had authorized
their respective state utility commissions to regulate the rates and
operations of natural gas companies within the particular state
jurisdictions. Moreover, prior to 1938 there had been significant
decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining to a certain
extent the limits of state regulatory authority over the natural gas
industry. It was largely on the basis of these decisions that the provisions of the Natural Gas Act in 1938 were drawn, when Congress
first entered the field of Federal regulation of the natural gas industry. At least a summary glance at these decisions of the
Supreme Court prior to 1938 is indispensable to a complete understanding of the provisions of the Natural Gas Act.
Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court had recognized that Congress
THE CASES PRIOR TO

This is a current revision of a paper written by Mr. Sargent while a student at
the University of Denver College of Law.
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had not entered the field of regulation of the natural gas industry
and that the states had certain well-defined areas of responsibility
in which they could act to regulate the industry in the interests of
the public. The Landon case I is good authority that a state could
then regulate an independent local distributor of natural gas and
could fix its retail rates to ultimate consumers within the state even
though the natural gas was received by the local distributor from
an interstate carrier. The Court stated that the interstate movement of gas ended when the gas passed into the mains of the local
distributor.
In the Penna. Gas Co. case, 2 the Court held that a direct (retail) industrial sale made by an interstate carrier was subject to
local state regulations even though the sale was made in interstate
commerce. The theory behind this decision was that even though
the sale was made in interestate commerce, in the absence of a
contrary regulation by Congress, a state might within a permissible
area pass laws indirectly affecting interstate commerce when such
laws were needed to protect matters of local interest.
Whereas the Penna. Gas Co. case held that a state could regulate a direct (retail) sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court determined in the Kansas Gas Co. case 3 that a state
could not regulate a sale made by a wholesale distributor in interstate commerce to a local distributor for resale, deeming this to be a
direct burden on interstate commerce.
Prior to 1938, there were no decisions of the Supreme Court
relating specifically to the regulation of production and gathering
of natural gas at the source of supply. However, the Attleboro Co.
case, 4 involving the sale of electric energy, is probably some authority to the effect that prior to 1938 the Supreme Court had determined that a state had no jurisdiction or power to regulate the rate
of the sale of the producer and gatherer of natural gas to the interstate transporter even though that sale was made at or within
the state boundary. 5
Clearly, at this time there was a recognition by the Supreme
Court of effective state regulation of some of the phases of the
natural gas industry. In most states, state utility commissions had
been given ample authority under state laws to regulate the local
utilities, including the natural gas utilities.
THE NATURAL GAS ACT OF 1.938
One of the primary objectives of the Natural Gas Act of 1938
was to provide Federal regulation in those cases where the state
utility commissions lacked authority under the interstate commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. There is no better stateSP.U.C.

v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236 (1918).
Penna. Gas Co. v. P.U.C., 252 U. S. 23 (1920).
:Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924).
SP.U.C. v. Attleboro Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
See Jersey Central Power & Light Co., v. F.P.C., 319 U. S. 61 (1943).
2
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ment of the purposes of Congress in passing the Natural Gas Act of
1938 than that of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Panhandle EasternPipeline Co. v. P.S.C.,0 wherein he says:
The act, though extending federal regulations, had no purpose
or effect to cut down state power. On the contrary, perhaps its primary purpose was to aid in making state regulation effective, by adding the weight of federal regulation to supplement and reinforce it
in the gap created by the prior decisions. The Act was drawn with
meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to
handicap or delete it in any way ...
The Natural Gas Act created an articulate legislative program
based on a clear recognition of the respective responsibilities of the
federal and state regulatory agencies. It does not contemplate ineffective regulation at either level. We have emphasized repeatedly that
Congress meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory
scheme, complementary in its operation to those of the States and in
no manner usurping their authority. . . . The scheme was one of
cooperative action between federal and state agencies.

It is Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act with which this article is particularly concerned. That section provides as follows:'
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption
for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to naturalgas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not
apply to any other transportation of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution
or to the production or gathering of natural gas.

The Natural Gas Act is aimed at Federal regulation of the
transporter and large-scale seller in interstate commerce,8 and
the Federal Power Commission is given authority to fix rates on
the sale of gas in interstate commerce for resale.9 The function
of regulating the intrastate sale and distribution of gas as well
as the production and gathering of gas is left to the states.
Subsequent to the Act, the Supreme Court in the Panhandle
Eastern Pipe-line case of 1947,10 consistent with the prior holding of that Court in the Penna. Gas Co. case, supra, determined that
Section 1 (b) of the Act does not prohibit regulation by the states
of direct sales in interstate commerce to the ultimate consumer.
Other subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, have
given rise to a demand for clarification of the original Act.
Production and Gathering
exempts the "production and gathering
(b)
clearly
Section 1
of natural gas" from application of the Act. Some confusion, however, has arisen in the interpretation of this provision. The Act at
'332 U. S. 507, 517-520 (1947).
52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 b 1940. Italics supplied.
8F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
9 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 324 U. S. 581 (1945).
10Supra, n. 6.
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no point defines what is meant by the term "production and gathering", nor do prior decisions of the Court lend any light in this regard. Thus the problem exists, what did Congress intend to exempt
in excluding from application of the Act the "production and gathering" of natural gas?
At the time of the original consideration in Congress of the
Act, Senator Wheeler, Chairman of the Committee on Interstate
Commerce, gave the following response, on the floor of the Senate,
to the question "does this bill undertake to regulate the production
of natural gas, or does it undertake to regulate the producers of
natural gas ?" He said:"
It does not attempt to regulate the producers of natural gas or the
distributors of natural gas; only those who sell it wholesale in interstate commerce.

The problem of what Congress intended in exempting production and gathering of natural gas in Section 1 (b) first came up2
in the Supreme Court in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. F.P.C.1
In that case, the Court concluded that Section 1 (b) did not prevent
the Federal Power Commission from taking into account the production properties and gathering facilities of natural gas companies
where it fixes their rates subject to its jurisdiction.13 The Court
commented that the exemption of production and gathering of
natural gas in Section 1 (b) meant only that the Federal Power
Commission has no control over the drilling and spacing of wells
and the like. There was a strong dissent in the Colorado Interstate
Co. case by Mr. Justices Roberts, Reed, and Frankfurter and Mr.
Chief Justice Stone on the ground that the Federal Power Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in including wells and gathering
facilities in the rate base of the interstate wholesale sales.
The Interstate Gas Co. case 14 in 1947 held that even though
Congress has exempted the production and gathering of natural
gas from application of the Natural Gas Act, that exemption does
not preclude the Federal Power Commission from regulating the
rate of the purchase by an interstate transporter from an affiliated
intrastate producer and gatherer. This decision was based on the
prior decisions of the Attleboro Co. case and the Jersey Power Co.
case involving sale of electrical energy, supra.
The most recent case involving an interpretation by the Supreme Court of the exemption of production and gathering of
natural gas in Section 1 (b) is F.P.C. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co.,' 5 decided June 20, 1949. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line
Co. transports and markets natural gas in interstate commerce by
1181 Cong. Rec. 9312.
12Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. F.P.C., supra note 9.
13 In accord, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. F.P.C., 324 U. S. 635 (1945).
In
this case, it was held that the F.P.C. could also take into consideration unregulated
direct industrial sales in fixing a fair rate of return for regulated wholesale rates.

14Interstate Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 331 IT. S. 682 (1947).

337 U. S. 498 (1949).
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means of its pipeline system which runs from Texas into Michigan.
In addition it owns or controls gas-producing properties in Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Texas. The question to be decided by the Court was,
may such a natural gas company subject to the Act, sell leases covering an estimated twelve per cent of its total gas reserves without
the approval and contrary to an order of the Federal Power Commission. The Commission argued that there was a distinction between the activities of production and gathering, such as drilling,
spacing wells, or collecting gas on the one hand, and the facilities,
such as reserves and gas bases, used therefor on the other hand.
It claimed that only the former were excluded by Section 1 (b)
from the coverage of the Act. The Court rejected this argument,
viewing leases as an essential part of production. The Court noted
that the Commission up to that time had never claimed the right
to regulate dealings in gas acreage. It held that Section 1 (b) of
the Act excluding the production and gathering of natural gas from
application of the Act, left the transfer of gas leases to state regulation and outside the scope of the regulatory powers of the Federal
Power Commission.
The Colorado Interstate Gas Co. case, the Interstate Gas Co.
case, and the Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. case of 1949 point
up the difficulty the Court has had in interpreting the intent of
Congress in excluding the production and gathering of natural gas
from application of the Natural Gas Act. The Interstate Gas Co.
case in particular has resulted in confusion. The argument is made
that the intent of Congress, in excluding production and gathering
of natural gas and in defining a "natural-gas company" under the
Act as a company "engaged in the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce," 16 was to exempt independent producers or
gatherers of natural gas and their sales thereof to interstate pipe
lines from the provisions of the Act. As a consequence, Congress
undertook to re-examine the Natural Gas Act with the idea in
mind of giving consideration to this problem ard adopting appropriate amendatory legislation.
The Kerr Bill: The Kerr Bill sought to amend Section 1 (b)
by adding to the provision that the Act shall not apply to the production or gathering of natural gas, the following :17
Or to any arm's length sale of natural gas made by one producer
or gatherer to another producer or gatherer or made at or prior to
the point of delivery of such gas into interstate transmission facilities
(of a natural-gas company) or to incidental transportation of natural
gas necessary for delivery of such gas to such other producer or gatherer or into interstate transmission facilities (of a natural gas company): Provided, that such arm's length sale and incidental transportation are by a producer or gatherer not otherwise engaged in
and not controlled by or controlling a person otherwise engaged in
the transportation or sale of natural gas for resale in interstate
commerce.
STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 a
17S. 1498, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
1852

(6)

(1940).
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The Kerr Bill was passed by both the House and the Senate, but
was vetoed on April 15, 1950 by the President.
Local Distribution
We have already seen that Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas
Act provides that the Act shall apply to the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce and to the sale thereof in interstate commerce for resale, but that it goes on to provide:
... but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural
gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used
for such distribution.

Section 2 of the Act gives the following definitions:
(6) "Natural-gas company" means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale."
(7) "Interstate Commerce" means commerce between any point
in a State and any point outside thereof, or between points within
the same State but through any place outside thereof, but only insofar
0
as such commence takes place within the United States."

Avowedly, the intent of Congress in enacting Sections 1 (b)
and 2 of the Natural Gas Act was to exclude Federal regulation of
local distribution and the facilities used for such distribution. This
conclusion is borne out from the statement of Senator Wheeler discussed above in connection with the exclusion of production and
gathering of natural gas from application of the Act. Reference
has previously been made to the Landon case, which apparently was
a contributing factor to the exclusion of local distribution facilities
in Section 1 (b).
20
Test of wholesale or retail sales: In the Illinois Gas Co. case,
the Supreme Court in 1942 held that by virtue of the Natural Gas
Act, a state had no authority to order an extension of transmission
facilities of an intrastate wholesale distributor. The basis of this
decision was that the intrastate wholesale distributor was a subsidiary of the interstate transporter from which it received the gas
into its system; therefore, it was a natural gas company transporting gas in interstate commerce and subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal Power Commission.
Relying on the Illinois Gas Co. case, the Supreme Court in
1945 determined in Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. v. F.P.C.21 that the
Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction over the wholesale
sales made by the Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. in Colorado. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. transmits gas from Amarillo, Texas fields to
18 Supra, n. 16.
1152 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717a (7) (1940).
"oIllinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois P. S. Co., 314 U. S. 498 (1942).
21324 U. S. 626 (1945).
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Colorado. Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. purchases gas from Colorado
Interstate Co. at Littleton and sells this gas in both Colorado and
Wyoming to local companies and municipalities for resale to the
public. The Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. contended that the wholesale sales made to Colorado towns were made in intrastate commerce, and thus those sales were not subject to regulation by the
Federal Power Commission. However, the Supreme Court held that
Colorado-Wyoming Gas Co. was transporting gas in interstate commere to Colorado towns for resale, and its sales to Colorado towns
were subject to Federal regulation. The Court stated that interstate commerce "does not end until the gas enters the service pipes
of the distributing companies" 22 (companies selling retail to the
public).
Thus, in the Illinois Gas Co. case and in the Colorado-Wyoming
Gas Co. case, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Federal
regulatory authority under Section 1 (b) of the Act as including
not only sales made in interstatecommerce for resale, but also sales
made in intrastate commerce for resale.
Test of change in gas pressures: There is another line of cases
which raises a somewhat different problem as to the exclusion of
local distribution facilities from Federal regulation in Section 1 (b).
The first of these is not a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, but is a decision of the Federal Power Commission, the
significance of which is so important that it must be discussed
herein. The case decided in 1949 is Re Consolidated Co. of N. y.23
The case involved a proposal by Transcontinental Pipe Line Corp.
to deliver gas produced in Texas and Louisiana to Consolidated
Edison Co., and others in New York for resale to ultimate consumers in the New York metropolitan area. All of the properties presently owned or proposed to be constructed by Consolidated Edison
were within the State of New York and the local distributing companies were unaffiliated with the interstate transporter. The Commission held, in spite of the exclusion of local distribution facilities
from jurisdiction of the Commission under Section 1 (b) of the
Natural Gas Act, that Consolidated Edison was a natural gas company under the Act, engaged in the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, and was thus required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Commission upon
construction of the transmission facilities to inter-connect with the
transmission lines of Transcontinental. To support this conclusion,
the Commission stated that the gas would be transported through
Transcontinental's pipe lines at a pressure of 200 pounds, which
pressure would be continuous and uninterrupted on delivery into
the pipe line of Consolidated Edison, and that the pressure would
then be reduced in the lines of Consolidated for distribution to the
21Id.
2381

at 629.
P.U.I:5 (N.s.)

65 (1949).
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public. Since the flow of gas was uninterrupted and continuous up
to and beyond the point of delivery to Consolidated, the Commission
held that Consolidated was engaged in the transportation of natural
gas in interstate commerce. The ramifications of this decision are
seen in the East Ohio Gas Co. 2 4 case.
The East Ohio Gas Co. case, decided January 9, 1950, is the
most recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
relative to the Natural Gas Act, and the significance of this decision
is unparalleled by any other decision pertaining to that Act. 25 East
Ohio Co. was a company operating solely in Ohio selling natural gas
directly to consumers at retail through its local distribution system.
Gas was delivered to East Ohio Co. inside Ohio by an interstate
transporter, with which East Ohio Co. was not affiliated in any way.
The Supreme Court held that East Ohio Co. was subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission and was required to keep
accounts for and submit reports to the Commission. The basis of
this decision was the determination by the Court that the dividing
line between federal and state regulation is at that point where gas
transmitted under high pressure is converted to low pressure for
shipment to the ultimate consumer. Since East Ohio Co. received
the gas in its trunk line at high pressure, the Court found that it
was a natural gas company engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.
As a matter of fact, prior to the East Ohio Gas Co. case in
January, 1950, the Court had flatly rejected any such mechanical
formula. In the Interstate Gas Co. case, supra, it was argued that
gas moved through petitioner's pipe lines at well-pressure and
that interstate commerce did not begin until it was subjected to increased pressure in the compressor stations of the purchasing interstate transporter. The Court rejected the argument stating that the
increase in pressure "must be regarded as merely an incident in
interstate commerce rather than as its origin." In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line v. P.S.C., supra, Mr. Justice Rutledge said,
Variations in main pressure are not the criterion of the state's
regulatory powers, under the commerce clause.

The Bricker Bill: It was largely as a result of the Illinois Gas
Co. and Colorado -Wyoming Gas Co. cases that the so-called Bricker
Bill was first introduced in Congress. 26 The importance of the
Bricker Bill was given additional significance by the East Ohio Gas
Co. case. This bill would amend Section 2 (6) of the Natural Gas
Act to define a natural gas company so as to exclude from federal
regulation a company engaged in local distribution within a state
which receives natural gas within or at the border of such state in
local distribution facilities and sells and delivers such gas to the
-338 U. S. 464 (1950).

2 45 Public Utilities Fortnightly 201-208 (Feb. 16, 1950).
20S. 1831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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general public for ultimate consumption or to another company engaged in local distribution within the same state which sells gas to
the general public. The bill would specifically declare such sales
and companies subject to regulation by the states. The bill amends
the definition of "interstate commerce" in Section 2 (7) of the Act
by adding to that section the words:
... but does not mean commerce beyond the point at which natural
gas is delivered into local distribution facilities as hereafter defined.

Section 2 of the Act would also be amended to add a new subsection (10) which would define "local distribution" as follows:
"Local distribution" means the operation of local distribution
facilities and includes the delivery or sale of gas therefrom; and
"local distribution facilities" means pipe lines and other facilities
used for or incident to the distribution of natural gas to the general
public, and includes those transmission or transportation facilities
of the person engaged in local distribution within a State which extend from the areas of such local distribution to the point or points
within or at the border of such State at which natural gas is received
from the facilities of a natural gas company.
CONCLUSION

It should be apparent that the cooperative regulation by state
and Federal agencies of the natural gas industry is an extremely
complicated matter. Herein, consideration has been given only to
some of the aspects of jurisdiction of the Federal government in
this field. However, the fact that such cooperative regulation by
Federal and state bodies is complicated and difficult to administer
is no justification for an extension of the authority of the Federal
government in this field. Above all, it is imperative in the public
interest that Congress enact legislation designed to clarify the
limits of jurisdiction of the Federal Government and the states
over the natural gas industry.

DENVER BAR OUTING TO BE HELD THIS MONTH
As Dicta goes to press, Entertainment Committee Chairman
Dick Shaw informs us that the annual Denver Bar outing will be
held as usual the last week in June. Special notification of the
exact day, place and hour will be made later.
Notices will go out to all members shortly requesting information as to the type of activity in which they wish to indulge and
indicating when and where tickets may be purchased. As in previous years, prizes will be awarded in golf, bridge, tennis, horseshoes, and chess. The sports, indoors and otherwise, will be climaxed by a banquet at 6:30, following which alleged entertainment
will be provided by The Hiester Hotshots and Shaw's Shaky
Shenanigans.
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TAXATION AND SEVERED MINERAL ESTATES
WILLARD S. SNYDER
of the Denver Bar *

It is well settled that the terms "mineral" or "mineral rights"
include oil and gas.' It is in that sense that the word "mineral" is
used herein. Solid minerals such as coal and iron are beyond the
scope of this article.
Inasmuch as the production of oil and gas is becoming more
and more prominent in the economy of the Rocky Mountain area,
it is important for the attorney to become acquainted with the legal
problems involved. This article is concerned with the following
problem: When the mineral estate is owned separately from the
surface estate, and the land is sold for delinquent taxes, does a
tax deed 2 carry the mineral estate?
First of all, there are some fundamentals that we should have
firmly in mind. It is well settled that separate estates may be
created in respect to minerals, including oil and gas. Such separate
estates may be created by a deed of the land excepting and reserving all or part of the minerals. Or the separate estates may be
created by a deed of all or a part of the minerals only. 3 The process
by which the separate estates are created is called a "severance."
If there has been no severance of the mineral estate from the
surface estate, the minerals in and under the land are a part
thereof and are taxable against the owner of the land. 4 It would
follow, of course, that the recipient of a valid tax deed to such land
would become vested with both the surface and mineral estates in
and to such land.
Turning directly to the situation where there has been a prior
severance of the mineral estate, we find that our problem may be
divided into two major parts. These are: (1) where the tax deed
is invalid and (2) where the tax deed is valid.
PROBLEM WHERE TAX DEED IS INVALID

There are many more or less technical reasons why a tax deed
may be invalid. For example, it may be void for uncertainty of
description or it may be void because of recitals therein that show
a noncompliance with or violation of the statutes concerning tax
deeds and the antecedent procedure upon which said deeds are
based.5 Assuming that the tax deed is invalid, for some such reason,
it is unnecessary to distinguish between a tax deed based upon a
sale of the mineral rights, and a tax deed based upon a sale of the
* Written while Mr. Snyder was a graduate student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
;Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F. 2d 824 (10 Cir. 1927).
The term ordinarily used in Colorado is "treasurer's deed." The term "tax deed"

is used herein for the sake of uniformity when referring to various Jurisdictions.
'Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (2d ed.)
'Id., § 787.

5

'Calvat v, Juhan, 119 Colo. 561, 206 P. 2d 600 (19.49).

784.
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land by its government description without, in terms, including or
excluding the mineral rights. In either case, the tax deed will not
in and of itself pass good and sufficient title to the severed mineral
estate, said estate being the one in which we are here interested.
Closely connected with the problem where the tax deed is invalid is the question of adverse possession. The holder of the tax
deed may admit its invalidity, but nevertheless argue that it constituted color of title and seek to establish adverse possession to
the mineral estate. However, one of the most firmly established
and universally accepted rules of law in the field of oil and gas is
that after severance of the mineral rights, adverse possession of
the surface is not adverse possession of the oil and gas underneath. 6
In a case involving a tax sale of mineral rights, the Supreme Court
of Colorado held that after a severance of the mineral rights,
possession of the surface does not constitute possession of the
mineral estate, and the owner of the minerals does not lose his
rights by any length of nonuser. 7 Thus, it may be seen that adverse
possession of the severed mineral estate cannot be perfected except
by drilling a well and taking actual physical possession of the minerals and holding such possession for the statutory period.
PROBLEM WHERE TAX DEED IS VALID

An example may help to clarify the discussion. A is the fee
owner of Blackacre. A conveys Blackacre to B reserving and
excepting the minerals in and under the land. Later B fails to pay
his taxes. Blackacre is sold for taxes, the land being described by
its government description without expressly including or excluding the minerals. Ultimately a tax deed is issued to Y. The tax
deed and the procedure upon which it is based are valid. The only
question is: Does the tax deed carry the mineral estate? In other
words, does A or Y now own the mineral estate?
There has been no express ruling on this question by the
Supreme Court of Colorado. Consequently, it is necessary to look
to decisions from other jurisdictions in order that we may have
some basis for an opinion upon the point involved. Of course, Colorado statutes and judicial precedents are controlling as far as they
are applicable. But there are questions of policy and emphasis
involved which have permitted the highest tribunals of the various
states to reach opposite results, and an effort will be made to tie
in these questions of policy and emphasis with the statutes and
judicial precedents of Colorado.
A mechanical aproach to the problem disclosed that in Arkansas,, Minnesota,9 Missouri,"0 New Mexico," and Wyoming," it has
13 A. L. R. 375.
, Note 5, supra.
'Huffman v. Henderson Co., 184 Ark. 278, 42 S.W. 2d 221 (1931).
Washburn v. Gregory Co., 125 Minn. 491, 147 N. W. 706 (1914).
10
Kernkamp v. Wellsville Fire Brick Co., 237 Mo. App. 457, 170 S. W. 2d 692 (1943).
11
SiiS v. Vosburg, 43 N. M. 255, 91 P. 2d 434 (1939).
12 Ohio oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency .....
Wyo ...... 179 P. 2d 773 (1947).
O
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been held that a tax deed in which the land is described by its government description does not pass title to a prior severed mineral
estate. In California,13 Mississippi, 4 and West Virginia, 5 it has
been held that a tax deed in which the land is described by its government description does pass title to a prior severed mineral estate. Thus, we have the familiar situation of a conflict of authority,
although at least it can be said that the weight of authority is to
the effect that the tax deed does not pass title to the prior severed
mineral estate.
Of more importance than a mere weight of authority is the
reasoning upon which these various decisions are based. Some of
the above cited cases are not too helpful one way or the other. For
example, the supreme court of Wyoming in Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 1o without advancing much in the way. of reasons,
merely states the rule than when the mineral estate is owned separately from the surface estate, and the land is assessed in the name
of the owner of the surface, a valid tax sale would not seem to
carry the mineral estate. Then there are those states which advance
reasons for their holdings, but the logic involved would not be of
weight in Colorado, because of judicial precedents in Colorado. Unfortunately such holdings appear on both sides of the fence.
THE SAME YARDSTICK WITH DIFFERENT RESULTS

The California case of McCracken v. Hummel 17 holds that the
owner of the tax title acquired the oil and gas rights in the property
even though there had been a prior severance of the mineral estate. The court reasons that since there were no separate assessments of the severed oil rights, and since the same assessment
was placed upon the land as upon adjoining land where there
was no severed mineral estate, the assessment upon the land in
question included the severed oil rights; therefore, the holder of the
tax deed acquired title to both the surface estate and the mineral
estate.
The New Mexico case of Sims v. Vosburg 18 holds that the
holder of the tax title did not acquire the mineral rights in the property when there had been a prior severance of the mineral estate.
The prior severance was in favor of private parties. The court
reasons that since the land in question was assessed at the same
value as adjacent and similar land from which the minerals had
been severed by the United States Government instead of private
parties (and could, therefore, not be taxed), the severed mineral interests in question were neither assessed nor sold for taxes and
that the holder of the tax title obtained no title to the mineral interests by virtue of his tax deed.
13McCracken v. Hummel, 43 Cal. App. 2d 302, 110 P. 2d 700 (1941).
4

Stern v. Parker, 200 Miss. 27, 25 So. 2d 787 (1946).

1' Peterson
,GNote 12,
"TNote 13,
"8Note 11,

v. Hall, 57 W. Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1905).
supra.

supra.
supra.
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It will be seen immediately that the courts of California and
New Mexico have used the same reasoning. The yardstick used is
a comparison between the assessment of the land from which the
mineral estate has been severed and the assessment of adjoining
and similar land from which the mineral estate has either not been
severed, or, if it has been severed, the severance was in favor of the
government, in which event taxation of the mineral estate was
impossible.
Such reasoning is not necessarily valid. In the Colorado case
of Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hanna,19 which involved a different
question, such reasoning was rejected. In that case, the railroad
was the owner of severed mineral estates in and under every oddnumbered section of land in Weld County within 20 miles of the
railroad right of way. The proceeding before the court was an action to reduce the assessed valuation of these reserved mineral
rights. The assessor had assessed the surface estates in the oddnumbered sections from which the mineral estates had been severed
at the same value that he had assessed the land in the even-numbered sections from which the mineral estates had not been severed.
In addition to the assessment of the surface estate in the oddnumbered sections, the assessor had assessed the reserved mineral
estates to their owner, the Union Pacific Co. The railroad argued
that this was discriminatory. The court rejected this argument,
saying that if the surface estate in the odd-numbered sections subject to mineral reservations is assessed too high, in comparison
with the assessment of the land in the even-numbered sections without reservation, this works no hardship on the Union Pacific Co.,
-owner of the reserved mineral estates. Thus, the test used in California and New Mexico of comparing the assessment of the surface estate from which the minerals have been severed with the
assessment on adjoining land without reservations probably could
not be used in Colorado. For in Colorado, even though the surface
of the land subject to mineral reservations is assessed at-the same
value as adjoining land without reservations, the highest tribunal
in the state has taken the position that the surface estate subject
to the reservation may have been assessed too high, or the land
without reservations may have been assessed too low. Therefore,
even though the assessments on adjoining tracts of land (one being
subject to a mineral reservation, and the other not) are the same,
it would not follow that the assessment of the land subject to a mineral reservation was an assessment which included the minerals.
When there has been a prior severance of the mineral estate with no
separate assessment of that estate, and when the land is assessed
in the name of the owner of the surface, it would seem that a tax
sale in Colorado would not carry the severed mineral estate, for
there would be no practical way of showing that the severed min19 73 Colo. 162, 214 P. 550 (1923).
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eral estate had even been assessed, let alone sold at the tax sale.
However, it should be emphasized that the problem and facts under
consideration in the Union Pacific case were entirely different from
the subject under discussion here, and the language used by the
court in that case would not necessarily be controlling if the court
were called upon to decide the question here involved.
SEPARATE ASSESSMENT STATUTES NOT

Too

HELPFUL

Other courts have taken a different approach to the problem
from that taken in California and New Mexico. Some states have
what are termed "separate assessment statutes." That is, it is provided by statute that when the surface estate and mineral estate
are separately owned, they may, or must, be separately assessed.
Colorado has no such statute. Even so, it was expressly held by0
the Colorado Supreme Court in Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Hanna'
that a severed mineral estate was separately assessable to the owner
thereof. A person would expect that in a state having a separate
assessment statute a tax sale would not carry the severed mineral
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Huffman v. Henderson
estate.
21
Co., so held on the basis of Arkansas's separate assessment statute.

But the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in the case of Stern v. Parker,22 held that the tax sale carried the severed mineral estate. This
conclusion was reached notwithstanding the fact that Mississippi
has a separate assessment statute 23 which, in referring to a severed
mineral estate, provides: "all of such interest shall be assessed, and
taxed separately from such surface rights." It appears that the
separate assessment statute is not as important a factor in determining whether a tax sale will carry the severed minerals as initial
appearances might indicate. Mississippi takes the position that it
was the duty of the owner of the severed mineral estate to see that
it was separately assessed and that such owner had failed in his
duty by not paying taxes on his mineral estate. As a matter of
policy, it was thought that the payment of taxes should be encouraged, that attempts to evade just taxes should be discouraged,
and that the owner of the severed mineral estate was in no
position to complain. As to the question of whether the severed
mineral estate had ever been assessed, the Supreme Court of Mississippi took what might be called a practical approach. The court
states that when the land was assessed by its government description, the land was assessed in its entirety, and this means all of its
assessable estate.
The Minnesota case of Washburn v. Gregory Co. 24 is a leading

case often cited by those courts which hold that a tax sale in which
the land was described by its government desctription without including or excluding the minerals held by a person other than the
20 Note 19, supra.

8, supra.
"Note 14, 8upra.
"Miss Code, J 9970 (1942).
2Note 9, supra.
2Note
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owner of the surface does not carry such severed mineral estate.
The Minnesota court takes a duty approach to the problem by holding that it is the duty of the taxing officers to assess and tax separately the interests of the owner of the minerals and the owner of
the surface. The court states that when the land sold for taxes is
described by its government description, it will not be presumed
that the separate property of another (the owner of the minerals)
is included in the general description used in the tax proceedings.
The Mississippi Supreme Court puts the emphasis on the duty
of the owner of the minerals to see that his property is separately
assessed and that he pays taxes thereon. The Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasizes the duty of the taxing officers to separately assess
the separate estate, and thereby these two courts reach opposite
results. Yet it is believed that it is generally the duty of the taxing officers to assess all taxable property, and it is the duty of the
owner of the taxable property to return it for taxation. Such is
the law in Colorado. 25 Although there are persuasive arguments
to support the Mississippi court in its holding that a tax sale passes
title to the prior severed mineral estate, it still is not felt that Colorado could accept the Mississippi court's holding that when there is
a prior severance of the mineral estate, the assessment of the land
by its government description includes the land in its entirety, i.e.
all of its assessable estates. Before Colorado could accept this proposition, it would be necessary for our Supreme Court to reject the
in support of its decision
same kind of reasoning that it advanced
26
in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hanna.
A PRACTICAL SUGGESTION

It is of course apparent that in a question such as we are concerned with here, it is impossible to predict absolutely what the
law in Colorado may be determined to be at some future day. The
best that can be hoped for is what might be called an educated
guess. Preventive jurisprudence has been called the most useful
branch of the law. If a person is the owner of a severed mineral
estate in Colorado, and if he wants to protect his said estate fully,
it is suggested that he write to the assessor requesting a separate
assessment of his mineral estate. If minerals are not being produced thereon, it will be assessed for a nominal amount, and by
paying the tax assessed, he will be fully protected. Possible litigation will be avoided, and the owner of the severed mineral estate
will have the satisfaction of knowing that his title is perfectly safe.

THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
In the bullish market for a complete set of Colorado reports
is the firm of Davis and Lutz, 636 Symes Bldg., Denver, Main 1215.
wThe People v. Pitcher, 61 Colo. 149, 170, 156 P. 812 (1916) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c.
142, J§ 2, 20, 48, and 50 (1935).
26 See note 19, supra.
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THE DENVER LAWYERS REFERRAL SERVICE
NORMA L. COMSTOCK
of the Denver Bar and Chairman, Legal Service Committee

During the Denver Bar Association presidency of Edward G.
Knowles, a committee consisting of H. Shields Mason, Donald C.
McKinlay, Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Roscoe Walker, Jr., and the
chairman, was appointed to study and attempt to establish a
legal reference plan. This subject had previously been under discussion by a similar committee of the Colorado Bar Association
of which Milton Blake was and is chairman. It had been preceded
by a previous Denver committee which had occupied itself principally with studies of the plans in operation in other large cities
in the United States, notably New York and Chicago.
After several meetings recommendations were made to the
trustees of the Denver Bar Association in February of 1949, and,
pursuant to such recommendations, a plan of reference was set-up
to operate through the existing joint office of the Denver and Colorado bar associations in charge of the secretary. Members of the
bar association who regularly read their copies of Dicta and other
material released by their secretary are familiar with the cards of
registration furnished to the members of the bar and the invitation
to participate in the plan which was sent out to all members on
April 13, 1949. With the invitation were enclosed the rules of the
reference service which are reproduced below.
Almost 200 lawyers registered for the panel then, and since
that time additions have been made so that the panel now exceeds
that number. The rules provide that an annual invitation be issued
to bar association members, and the invitation was repeated at the
recent bar luncheon at which a committee report was made. New
association members are automatically sent application cards and
copies of the rules.
During the one year of operation of the service, without any
attempt being made to publicize it, referrals were made through
the secretary in about 60 cases. Some business resulted, and the
situation seemed to indicate that the plan was ready for general
publication.
On May 10th of this year a letter describing the service and
inviting persons to utilize it was mailed to a large number of organizations and people in Denver, including the judges and clerks
of all the courts, the District Attorney's office, Police Department,
various personnel departments in large businesses, realtors, and
other who the committee believed might be requested to supply
information on attorneys to inquiring parties. Insufficient time
has elapsed to demonstrate whether this publicity will cause so
many public contacts with the bar association office as to require
extended facilities in that office. Generally, however, the service
seems to meet the approval of the bar and public alike as a work-
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able arrangement whereby persons who do not know attorneys
may be put in touch with reputable and capable counsel.
It is anticipated that the experience of the Denver Bar Association in the matter will serve as a guide to the establishment of
similar services in other Colorado cities. Colorado Bar Association
president, James K. Groves, has expressed his belief that such a
plan would be of great value even in the smaller towns throughout
Colorado, and it is hoped that the activities of the Denver committee
will have served some good purpose in establishing a precedent for
other cities to follow.
The "Rules of the Lawyers Referral Service" are as follows:
1. Any member of the Denver Bar Association in good standing who agrees to comply, and does comply, with the following
rules, shall be eligible for service on the reference list, except the
secretary and the members of the Legal Service Committee.
2. Any member willing to serve as a reference lawyer shall
register with the secretary. A lawyer may designate up to three
types of cases which he prefers not to handle, and he may designate
any field or fields of law in which he is a specialist.
3. The committee shall have the authority to classify attorneys for service on one or more panels, to add names and, for
cause, remove names from the list, or accept resignations at any
time. At least once each year the committee shall, by letter or
through Dicta, extend an invitation to the full membership of the
Denver Bar Association to register on the list.
4. All cases will be assigned by the secretary to the lawyers
on the reference list in rotation so far as practicable, giving due
consideration to requests for specialists and to the designated fields
not handled by individual lawyers. When possible, the secretary
will make a definite appointment for each applicant with the
selected lawyer, who shall report back within three days if the
appointment is not kept or reset. No assignment shall be considered complete until the lawyer has had one interview with the
client. If the assignment does not materialize, the lawyer may
notify the secretary and request a subsequent assignment. If, after
the preliminary conference, a lawyer for any reason does not wish
to proceed in a case requiring further action, he will ask the client
to return to the association's office for re-referral.
5. Reference lawyers shall accept the assignments graciously
and handle the work promptly and on the highest professional
standard, keeping in mind that this is a public service sponsored
by the Denver Bar Association and part of a plan for improved
public relations.
6. Upon request of the secretary, the reference lawyer shall
make a report on the current status of any case referred to him.
7. No referral shall be made if the client has previously consulted counsel and there is an existing lawyer-client relationship.
8. All questions or suggestions as to the manner in which
referred cases are handled or as to the functioning of the referral
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service shall be submitted to the secretary for appropriate action
by the Legal Service Committee.
9. The standard fee for all referral cases shall be $5 for a
consultation not to exceed one hour. Thereafter, the client and the
lawyer shall make their own arrangements for further services,
the lawyer using the Recommended Minimum Fee Standard as a
guide.
10. Any dispute arising between a referred client and a
referral attorney over the matter of fees shall be submitted to the
secretary for reference to the Legal Service Committee, whose
decision shall be controlling and final.
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